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Abstract 
This paper examines racial discrimination across several neighborhood and housing unit characteristics including 
racial composition, rent, and distance from the urban core. We find that African Americans face higher rates of 
discrimination than whites in a wide range of racially mixed neighborhoods, in higher rent areas, closer to 
central cities, and in low vacancy areas. These results are robust to various parameterizations of the local 
smoothing empirical specification and within a multivariate nonlinear parametric estimation technique. The 
location of discrimination supports the current/future customer prejudice and perceived preference hypotheses 
as a cause of discrimination in housing markets but not the landlord taste-based hypothesis. 
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1. Introduction 
The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) annually receives between 700 and 1000 complaints 
alleging discrimination on the basis of race or national origin,2 and spends approximately $25 million on 
enforcing Fair Housing Laws. About 2% of all complaints end with a charge of discrimination, and about 1% end 
in a referral to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for enforcement. In fiscal year 2010, DOJ actions resulted in over 
$1 million in penalties for Fair Housing Law violators, not including out of court settlements.3 Despite the dollars 
spent on enforcement and penalties landlords, real estate agents, and mortgage brokers face for violating these 
laws, racial discrimination is still apparent in housing markets across the U.S.4 The dollars spent on enforcement 
of Fair Housing Laws and the fact that agents still violate them leads to at least two questions: What motivates 
agents to discriminate? And, are there ways to reduce the cost of identifying violators? 
This paper examines how discrimination changes with neighborhood and housing unit characteristics, which 
offers insight into the causes of racial discrimination in housing markets and identifies areas where agents are 
most likely to violate Fair Housing Laws. We measure discrimination using data from a within-subjects field 
experiment, or matched-pair housing audit of landlords advertising rental housing on-line. The experiment 
communicates with landlords via e-mail, using names to signal race, and measures differential response rates 
between African Americans and whites. We match our measure of discrimination to data on housing unit and 
2010 Census neighborhood characteristics. 
We use a local polynomial smoothing estimation procedure to find where in the distribution of characteristics 
discrimination is more likely to occur. This estimation method provides a smooth prediction of discrimination 
outcomes across various characteristics of the neighborhood or housing unit. Local polynomial smoothing is 
advantageous in this setting as it does not assume a functional form for where discrimination may occur, it 
allows the data to determine the relationship. We examine several different dimensions of neighborhood and 
housing unit characteristics including, racial composition, distance to the city center, rental rates, and vacancy 
rates. 
The results suggest that there are particular areas within cities that are more prone to higher rates of 
discrimination against African American home-seekers. African Americans face higher rates of discrimination 
than whites in a wide range of racially mixed neighborhoods, in higher rent areas, closer in to the center city, 
and in low vacancy areas. The different locations of increased discrimination provide evidence that supports 
several hypotheses on the cause of discrimination. Generally, the results suggest current/future customer 
prejudice or perceived preference as a cause of discrimination and do not support landlord taste as a cause. The 
results also suggest that targeting enforcement efforts to particular areas of cities may help to reduce costs. 
The next section of the paper is a discussion of the previous research on housing market discrimination, and 
describes how examining where discrimination occurs can inform the causes of 
discrimination. Section 3 describes the experimental design and neighborhood data. Section 4 outlines the 
methodology for examining discrimination across neighborhood characteristics using non-parametric 
estimation. Section 5 presents the results, and the final section of the paper concludes. 
2. Background and causes of discrimination 
Discrimination against racial minorities in the housing market is well documented by experimental 
studies.5 These studies typically use data from pairs of actors that visit real estate agent offices on separate 
occasions and record treatment to researchers. Matched pair, or within-subjects experiments, often referred to 
as audits, began with Yinger (1986) and continue to be used in the literature to study discrimination today. 
Other studies that use data from in-person, matched pair experiments include Yinger (1991), Roychoudhury and 
Goodman (1992), Page (1995), Ondrich et al. (1998), Ondrich et al. (1999), Ondrich et al. (2000), and Ondrich et 
al. (2003), Choi et al. (2005), Zhao (2005), and Zhao et al. (2006). More recently, correspondence studies that 
use names to identify race, and e-mail communication, have appeared in the literature. These studies maintain 
the advantages of the experimental design, but avoid some of the problems associated with using in-person 
actors (see Heckman (1998) and Heckman and Siegelman (1993) for a detailed critique of in-person 
experiments). Studies that use e-mail based communication to study discrimination in the housing market 
include Carpusor and Loges (2006), Ahmed and Hammarstedt (2008), Ahmed et al. (2008), Ahmed and 
Hammarstedt (2009), Ewans et al. (forthcoming), Ahmed et al. (2010), Bosch et al. (2010), Hanson and Hawley 
(2011), and Hanson et al. (2011). 
All of the literature that examines discrimination in the housing market finds that discrimination occurs against 
minority clients to some degree. The literature examines a variety of ways that housing agents may practice 
unequal treatment of minority clients, including steering, providing information on or showing additional units, 
or asking for future visit opportunities. The Hanson et al. (2011) study even examines the text of landlord replies 
to inquires about rental housing to show that landlords use more positive language and are more descriptive 
about units when replying to white customers. 
We extend this literature along the lines of Yinger (1986) to examine the characteristics of neighborhoods where 
discrimination happens, and use this to inform the likely cause of discrimination. Yinger (1986) hypothesizes 
three causes of discrimination in housing markets, and how they relate to the racial composition of 
neighborhoods.6 
The first hypothesis Yinger describes is that agents (landlords) discriminate because of their own tastes or 
prejudice in dealing with minority clients. Yinger points out that this cause of discrimination may vary with 
landlord characteristics. For our purposes, because we do not have data on landlord characteristics, this cause of 
discrimination should result in a constant relationship between neighborhood characteristics and discrimination. 
The second hypothesis is that landlords discriminate because they act on behalf of prejudice customers (current 
or future tenants). This cause of discrimination is driven by statistical discrimination as described by Phelps 
(1972). Statistical discrimination implies an agent (landlord) uses past experiences to formulate the expected 
payoff for each potential home-seeker and selects a lessee by profit maximization. This type of discrimination 
may also be linked to landlords attempting to prevent the surrounding neighborhood from “tipping” beyond an 
acceptable minority share for white residents, as described in Card et al. (2008). Once a neighborhood reaches a 
tipping point share of minorities, it tends to become all minority residents, as whites find the neighborhood 
unacceptable. Another form of perceived prejudice that landlords may react to is from local public goods 
provision. Alesina et al. (1999) show that areas with more ethnic fragmentation spend less on ‘productive’ public 
goods, such as education, roads, sewers, and trash pickup. If landlords care about the level of local public goods 
provided in their area, they may intentionally try to keep minorities from locating in their communities in order 
to keep the level of local public goods high. 
Lastly, the landlord may treat minority and white clients differently because of what they perceive to be 
different preferences for neighborhoods or housing units among these groups. This would again be considered 
statistical discrimination by the definition in Phelps (1972). Yinger points out, and the Card et al. (2008) study 
confirms, that whites have a preference for neighborhoods with a vast white majority of residents. African 
Americans, on the other hand, have preference for integrated neighborhoods. 
3. Experimental design and data 
The key elements of studying where housing market discrimination occurs are an unbiased measure of 
discrimination, and data on local neighborhood characteristics. Our unbiased measure of discrimination comes 
from a field experiment conducted by Hanson and Hawley (2011). For data on neighborhood characteristics, we 
match the address of housing units in Hanson and Hawley (2011) to 2010 census tract level neighborhood 
characteristics using ArcGIS software. 
The Hanson and Hawley (2011) field experiment is a within-subjects, or matched pair audit correspondence 
study, of landlords across the United States.7 The data come from landlords of rental properties advertised on 
Craigslist.org. Craigslist allows participants to place and reply to on-line advertisements specific to local markets 
for jobs, housing, companionship, and other goods and services, although the experiment uses only listings 
pertaining to the rental housing market. Each landlord is sent two emails, one from an email address associated 
with a white name and one email from an address with an African American name. The experiment design relies 
on the names of the potential renters to signal race to the landlord. 
The fictitious renters' names come from Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004), who use Massachusetts birth 
certificate data from 1974 to 1979 to identify names highly associated with each race. The first names used to 
designate a white renter are Brad, Brendan, Brett, Matthew, Neil, Geoffrey, Todd, Greg, and Jay. The first names 
used to identify an African American renter are Darnell, Hakim, Jamal, Jermaine, Kareem, Leroy, Rasheed, 
Tremayne, and Tyrone. The last names for white renters are Davis, Ryan, Murphy, O'Brien, Baker, McCarthy, 
Young, Jones, and Wright. The last names used to represent African American renters are Johnson, Washington, 
Robinson, Jackson, Hall, Parker, Williams, Jones, and Cooper. 
The experiment consists of 4728 audits, or 9456 e-mail inquiries to advertisements for rental housing from 
Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Washington, D.C., Houston, Los Angeles, New York, Seattle, and San Francisco. 
All e-mail inquiries are sent between 9 am and 12 pm on the day after a landlord posts an advertisement (always 
a Wednesday). Inquiries are sent from g-mail account addresses in the following 
format: firstname.lastname.###@gmail.com, where ### is a three-digit number unique to each name. The 
overall response rate to e-mail inquiries is 53.9%, with 63.6% of landlords responding to at least one e-mail 
inquiry from a pair of e-mails. 
We use approximately 2000 audits from the original experiment that include one African American and one 
white name, the exact number depends on the neighborhood characteristic we examine.8 We examine 
discrimination across neighborhood demographics by identifying the addresses of the advertised housing units, 
and matching them to census information. The neighborhood information is determined at the census tract 
level. The address for each of the rental properties is geo-coded and identified with a unique census tract. With 
the census tract id information, we match the 2010 census data for each location and corresponding audit. 
4. Estimating discrimination rates across neighborhood characteristics 
We use the within-subjects experimental design to determine if a given landlord treats email inquiries equally or 
discriminates by only replying to one e-mail. To measure discrimination across characteristics, we calculate the 
discrimination rate against African Americans and whites. The discrimination rate against African Americans 
(whites) is the ratio of landlords that responded to the white (African American) home-seeker but not to the 






We calculate a discrimination rate for each “bin” in our non-parametric specification, where the size of the bin 
depends on the characteristic in question and the distribution of each variable. This means that we are 
aggregating landlords that rent units in census tracts with similar characteristics to create a discrimination rate. 
The original experiment measures discrimination at the landlord level, using one unit per landlord so that we are 
not counting discriminating (or non-discriminating) landlords more than once. 
There are four different characteristics for which we evaluate the changes in the discrimination 
rates. Table 1 provides a description and summary statistics for each of the neighborhood characteristics. The 
most influential neighborhood characteristic for discrimination studies is the population racial composition. We 
use the percentage of white residents within the neighborhood as the characteristic of interest. The average 
percentage of white residents in the sample is 61.8%. The second characteristic is how far the neighborhood is 
from the city center. We calculate the distance measure as straight-line distance from the centroid of the 
neighborhood, or census tract, to the tallest building for each respective city. The average distance to the city 
center for units in our sample is 10.6 miles. 
Table 1. Summary statistics. 
Variable Description Obs. Mean St. 
dev. 
Min Max 
Percentage of white 
residents 
The percentage of white residents. 2029 0.618 0.236 0.005 1 
Distance to city center The straight line distance to the city 
center (proxied by tallest building) 
in miles. 
2207 10.605 10.881 0.136 113.495 
Rental rate The advertised rental rate set by the 
landlord. 
2009 1488.04 769.37 250 8750 
Rental rate ratio The ratio of the advertised rental 
rate divided by the median rent for 
the city. 
2009 1.080 0.437 0.169 4.714 
Vacancy rate The percentage of rental properties 
that are for rent and vacant. 
2026 0.042 0.037 0 0.591 
Gross discrimination rate 
against whites 
The percentage of landlords who 
only responded to the African 
American client in the audit pair. 
2207 7.612 26.525 0 100 
Gross discrimination rate 
against African 
Americans 
The percentage of landlords who 
only responded to the White client 
in the audit pair. 
2207 13.14 33.791 0 100 
Central city = 1 if rental location is within the 
urbanized area 
2207 0.977 0.147 0 1 
 
Most units advertised on craigslist include an advertised rent, and we use this information, combined with data 
on city median rents to create a ratio of median rent for each unit in our sample.9 We use a ratio, rather than 
the nominal value of rent for each unit, to control for the vast differences in nominal rent values across the 
areas studied. The rent ratio provides insight to the level of discrimination in higher public good areas, as these 
qualities of the neighborhood are usually reflected in higher rents. The average landlord advertised rental rate is 
$1488.04, and the average rental ratio is 1.08, close to the median rent for the city. 
To understand how the supply of rental units in the neighborhood may affect discrimination, we calculate the 
vacancy rate as the number of for rent vacant rental units divided by the number of rental households.10 The 
average vacancy rate for neighborhoods in our sample is 4.2%. 
Table 1 also shows the gross discrimination rate against African Americans as 13.1% which is the percentage of 
audits where the landlord only responded to the white potential client. The gross discrimination rate against 
whites, or the percentage of audits where the landlord only responded to the African American potential client, 
is 7.6%. The indicator variable for central city is unity for housing units lying inside an urbanized area.11 
Table 2 summarizes how each of the neighborhood characteristics we examine relates to the Yinger hypotheses 
on the causes of discrimination. The simplest hypothesis is the landlord taste-based discrimination. The taste 
hypothesis states that the level of discrimination should not vary with the characteristics of the neighborhood 
but only due to the characteristic of the home-seeker. The resulting expectation is constant discrimination 
against African American home-seekers and no discrimination against white home-seekers. 
Table 2. Cause of discrimination hypotheses by neighborhood characteristic. 
 
Landlord taste Current or future 
customer 
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The second hypothesis tested is the current or future customer's prejudice. Under this hypothesis, landlords 
should discriminate more against one race when the surrounding population is of a different race. If the belief of 
the landlord is that current or future tenants who live in more homogenous neighborhoods want to continue to 
live in such neighborhoods, then landlords may discriminate more when the race of the home-seeker does not 
match the current demographic. An additional hypothesis that provides a very similar story is the tipping 
phenomenon. Tipping may appear as a desire for integration at very high percentage majority population 
followed by a rapid increase in discrimination against minority home-seekers as the neighborhood approaches 
the tipping point. This behavior is consistent with the current population trying to ‘save’ the neighborhood. After 
the tipping point is achieved, the hypothesis predicts a decline in discrimination rates against minority clients as 
the majority leaves and the neighborhood becomes fully integrated. 
The final hypothesis is the perceived preference or budget of a perspective client. If perceived customer 
preferences are driving landlord discrimination, we should find discrimination against whites in majority-
minority neighborhoods, and discrimination against African Americans only in vast majority white 
neighborhoods. Landlords in neighborhoods with very high percentages of white residents may not believe that 
an African American would truly want to live in their unit. The email inquiry may not be seen as genuine interest 
and thus the landlord does not respond. The perception is that each race may prefer a small amount of 
integration, but in neighborhoods with virtually no integration landlords may not see an inquiry as genuine 
interest. 
The primary method for analyzing the audit data is a local polynomial smoothing technique. This estimation 
strategy combines the simplicity of a parametric method, Weighted Least Squares (WLS), with the flexibility of a 
non-linear regression technique. The estimation fits multiple WLS regressions to ‘localized’ bins of the data 






The data within the bin that surrounds the point of interest are weighted with increased importance given the 
‘closer’ data. The same estimation is applied for all data points in the distribution, shifting ‘localized’ bins 
accordingly. The resulting smooth function, 𝑓, is a compilation of each point's WLS predicted value. 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝑓(𝑥𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖  
The local polynomial smoothing method, introduced by Cleveland (1979) and refined by Cleveland and Devlin 
(1988), places the resulting fitted values into a plot or functional form that is not possible to estimate with 
parametric techniques. The biggest benefit to using smoothing as opposed to standard linear regression is that it 
does not require a global functional form assumption of the underlying distribution of the data, only for each bin 
of the data. An additional benefit of the smoothing is that many of the parameters such as the degree of 
polynomial, bandwidth (size of the ‘localized’ bin), or weights, are flexible in the estimation. We choose local 
polynomial over other techniques, such as spline estimation, because it allows the data to determine where (or 
if any) structural breaks occur. 
The local polynomial smoothing technique also allows for confidence interval calculation. We use the confidence 
intervals to determine significant differences in the discrimination rates against either race along the 
distribution of the characteristic. These differences inform the plausibility of the underlying causes. 
Using local polynomial smoothing requires us to make three choices—the degree of polynomial estimate within 
bins, the bandwidth around each point, and the weights assigned to other points around each data 
point. Cleveland (1979) discusses choosing the degree of polynomial and finds that linear smoothing is almost 
always an adequate balance between flexibility and computational ease. The choice of higher degree 
polynomials does not change the results and only makes the intuition of the method more cumbersome. We 
must also choose a bandwidth around each observation to define how much of the data to use in each 
regression, we use the “rule of thumb” bandwidth.12 The Appendix A examines sensitivity of our results to this 
choice. The weights are kernel distributed.13 DiNardo and Tobias (2001) point out that, in general, non-
parametric estimates are not sensitive to the choice of how nearby observations are weighted. 
The local polynomial smoothing method is not a new empirical method in urban economics. Meese and Wallace 
(1991) use the nonparametric technique to evaluate hedonic price models and residential housing price 
indices. McMillen (1996) applies the locally weighted estimates to land value data from Chicago over the past 
150 years. The flexibility of the model helps provide insights on the polycentric nature of Chicago. More 
recently, McMillen and Redfearn (2010) show how hypothesis testing can be done with the local polynomial 
smoothing method. We are advancing this line of literature by using this flexible empirical method to analyze 
the location of discrimination across urban areas. 
5. Results 
5.1. Percent of white residents 
Fig. 1 shows the discrimination rates across the racial composition of the neighborhood surrounding rental 
properties in our data. The discrimination rate against African American home-seekers is significantly higher 
than against white home-seekers across the full range of neighborhoods. Discrimination against white home-
seekers does not fluctuate across neighborhood composition, which suggests racial composition is not 
important in determining the level of discrimination against whites. 
 
Fig. 1. Local linear smoothing by percentage of white residents. 
 
If we start at a location where the neighborhood comprises 100% white residents and slowly add minority 
households, we see the discrimination rate against African American home-seekers rises steadily. The current 
residents may be fearful of their neighborhood tipping, as the discrimination rate reaches a plateau at around 
80% white residents. This result is consistent with Card et al. (2008) as most of the neighborhoods showed 
tipping between 10 and 20% minority. There is no drop off in discrimination rates between 80% and 30% white 
residents which is not consistent with the expectation of tipping concerns. African American home-seekers face 
similar discrimination rates for a large range of mixed neighborhoods. Below 30% white residents, the 
discrimination rate falls, implying residents in neighborhoods with a large percentage of minority residents do 
not discriminate against African Americans as much as the landlords in mixed neighborhoods. This figure is not 
consistent with current or future customer prejudice, since the expectation under this hypothesis is higher levels 
of discrimination in largely white or African American neighborhoods. It is also not consistent with landlord 
taste-based discrimination as the rate of discrimination does significantly change with the racial composition. 
Fig. 2, Fig. 3, Fig. 4, Fig. 5 show examples of different city specific cases for discrimination by the percent of 
white residents in the surrounding neighborhood, as discrimination may differ across the distribution in each 
city.14 In Atlanta, the discrimination rate against white home-seekers falls as the percentage of white residents 
becomes larger. This is consistent with customer prejudice against living with white residents. Additionally, there 
is only a small significant difference in discrimination rates between African Americans and whites for Atlanta, 
and the location of this difference is consistent with a tipping concern story. As the minority population grows, 
so does the discrimination rate, but the rate begins to decline at around 75% white residents. 
 
Fig. 2. Local linear smoothing by percentage of white residents Atlanta sub-case. 
 
Fig. 3. Local linear smoothing by percentage of white residents Boston sub-case. 
 
Fig. 4. Local linear smoothing by percentage of white residents Chicago sub-case. 
 
Fig. 5. Local linear smoothing by percentage of white residents District of Colombia sub-case. 
 
Fig. 3 describes the Boston sub-case. There seems to be a constant discrimination rate difference against African 
Americans in Boston. Over a wide range of neighborhood compositions, below 85% white, the predicted 
difference is stable.15 Above 85 or 90%, the discrimination rate against African Americans does fall slightly this is 
again suggestive of a neighborhood tipping concern story. The Chicago sub-case tells a different 
story. Fig. 4 shows a desire for integration in neighborhoods that are highly white concentrated, as the rate of 
discrimination is not statistically different between white or African American home-seekers. However, as the 
minority share continues to climb, the difference becomes significant and peaks around 50%. This pattern may 
be consistent with perceived preference discrimination. Landlords may believe African Americans want to live in 
either mainly white neighborhoods or largely minority neighborhoods with less desire to be in the middle. 
Fig. 5 presents the District of Columbia sub-case. The highest rates of discrimination appear in the white 
concentrated neighborhoods and falls off steadily with the percentage of white residents. This city's sub-case is 
most consistent with the customer prejudice hypothesis. Landlords may believe that current neighbors or future 
clients will not appreciate integration in their neighborhoods and these preferences can produce a picture like 
the D.C. sub-case. 
5.2. Distance to city center 
With the stark difference in housing structures and social interaction within urban and suburban neighborhoods, 
examining discrimination rates by distance from center of the city may provide insight into how these factors 
influence discrimination. Fig. 6 shows the discrimination rate against African American home-seekers is always 
higher than whites across the entire distance distribution, although the rates do pinch together slightly at 
around 20 to 30 miles from the city center. Again, since the individual cities vary greatly on the types of 
neighborhoods at various distances, we look at the individual sub-cases to reveal more about potential causes.16 
 
Fig. 6. Local linear smoothing by distance from city center. 
 
Fig. 7 shows the Atlanta sub-case. This figure shows a preference for integration very close to the city center as 
well as in the suburbs between 15 and 30 miles away. Interestingly, there are two ranges of distances for which 
the discrimination rates are significantly different. In the urban setting from about 2 miles to 15 miles out and in 
the outer suburb ring (between 30 and 40 miles), where the discrimination rate against African American home-
seekers is statistically larger than against white home-seekers. This type of pattern may suggest customer 
prejudice as the landlords are likely aware of the clientele of those neighborhoods.17 The Chicago sub-case is 
similar as shown in Fig. 9. 
 
Fig. 7. Local linear smoothing by distance from city center Atlanta sub-case. 
 
Fig. 8. Local linear smoothing by distance from city center Boston sub-case. 
 
Fig. 9. Local linear smoothing by distance from city center Chicago sub-case. 
 
Fig. 8 describes the discrimination rate difference across distance for the Boston sub-case. In this case there 
does not seem to be a preference for integration near the city center but as the distance is increased the 
difference in discrimination rate goes away. Fig. 10 shows the District of Columbia sub-case which is similar to 
Boston in that there is a statistically significant difference very close to the city center. This difference disappears 
as the distance increases, but unlike Boston, in the further suburbs the difference reemerges. 
 
Fig. 10. Local linear smoothing by distance from city center District of Colombia sub-case. 
 
5.3. Advertised rental rate 
Fig. 11 presents the discrimination rates over the advertised rent relative to the median rent. At low rents 
relative to the median, there is no statistical difference in differential treatment against white or African 
American home-seekers. There is a large increase in discrimination against white home-seekers in the lower 
range. It may be that landlords do not believe the typical white customer will want to live in a low-rent area, and 
discriminates against them due to perceived preference. 
 
Fig. 11. Local linear smoothing by rent ratio. 
 
When the rent ratio reaches around 0.75, or at rents above 75% of the median, landlords start to discriminate 
more against African Americans than their white counterparts. This difference in discrimination rates continues 
to rise and peaks at around 1.5, or at rents that are 150% of the median. This type of result is suggestive of 
statistical discrimination, if the landlord has a perception of ability to pay from the racial group. Interestingly, as 
the rent ratio continues to increase the discrimination rates become closer and eventually not statistically 
different from each other. This suggests in very expensive areas landlords are not favoring African Americans or 
whites disproportionately, at least through initial email contact. This does not occur until very high levels of rent, 
where even inquiring about a rental unit may send a strong signal about ability to pay. 
In the city-specific cases, Atlanta (Fig. 12) and Boston (Fig. 13) are similar to the national average. The Chicago 
(Fig. 14) and D.C. (Fig. 15) sub-cases, there is statistically significant discrimination at the lower part of the rent 
ratio distribution that does not exist in the national sample. Although it is not entirely clear what is driving these 
differences, part of the reason may be the presence of other minority populations in Chicago and D.C. in low 
rent areas. 
 
Fig. 12. Local Linear smoothing by rent ratio Atlanta sub-case. 
 
Fig. 13. Local linear smoothing by rent ratio Boston sub-case. 
 
Fig. 14. Local linear smoothing by rent ratio Chicago sub-case. 
 
Fig. 15. Local linear smoothing by rent ratio District of Colombia sub-case. 
 
5.4. Neighborhood vacancy rate 
Fig. 16 examines discrimination across neighborhood vacancy rates. After a slow initial decline, the 
discrimination rate against African Americans rises sharply in neighborhoods starting with about 12% vacant 
units. This type of result is consistent with personal prejudice rather than other statistical discrimination 
hypotheses, as a profit maximizing landlord should rent to any client where marginal benefit exceeds marginal 
cost, and a client paying rent should be superior to leaving a unit empty in nearly all cases. 
 
Fig. 16. Local linear smoothing by vacancy rate. 
 
The Chicago sub-case (Fig. 19) shows a similar pattern to the national average, but all of the other city specific 
figures are substantially different. In Atlanta (Fig. 17) and the District of Columbia (Fig. 20), we find statistically 
meaningful discrimination against African Americans at low vacancy levels, and no discrimination at higher levels 
of vacancy—consistent with a statistical explanation, and not with landlord tastes, contrary to the national 
sample. Boston (Fig. 18) has the odd pattern of no discrimination at either high or low vacancy rates, but fairly 
constant discrimination in mid-level vacancy areas, although the vacancy distribution as a whole is shifted to the 
left. 
 
Fig. 17. Local linear smoothing by vacancy rate Atlanta sub-case. 
 
Fig. 18. Local linear smoothing by vacancy rate Boston sub-case. 
 
Fig. 19. Local linear smoothing by vacancy rate Chicago sub-case. 
 
Fig. 20. Local linear smoothing by vacancy rate District of Colombia sub-case. 
 
5.5. Multivariate parametric results 
We use a multivariate nonlinear parametric model using simple polynomial to check that the nonlinear 
relationships shown in the bivariate nonparametric estimation stay consistent. This robustness check increases 
the confidence of our estimation strategy and results. Table 3 shows the nonlinear parametric results. We 
estimate a linear probability model with additional neighborhood and unit characteristic control variables such 
as number of bedrooms, number of bathrooms, and the percentage of college graduates in the census tract. The 
dependent variable is a binary response variable with unity implying a response was received. All of the previous 
unit and neighborhood characteristics are used as independent variables both together (column 1) and 
separately (columns 3–6). 
Table 3. Response rate by unit and neighborhood characteristics. 
 
















African American (AA) 0.0106 − 0.0542*** 0.0131 − 0.0530** − 0.0126 − 0.0838***  
[0.10] [− 3.49] [0.18] [− 2.03] [− 0.19] [− 2.92] 
Percentage of white residents in the neighborhood 0.7137*** 
 
0.7517*** 





   
Square of percentage of white residents − 0.5993*** 
 
− 0.5783*** 





   
AA ∗ Percentage of white residents − 0.2842 
 
− 0.2866 





   
AA ∗ Square of percentage of white residents 0.2742 
 
0.2511 





   




































Percentage of median rent in the city 0.1518** 





   
[1.80] 
 
Square of percentage of median rent in the city − 0.0523** 





   
[− 2.25] 
 
AA ∗ Percentage of median rent in the city  − 0.0525 




   
[− 0.58] 
 
AA ∗ Square of percentage of median rent in the city 0.0122 





   
[0.45] 
 
Vacancy rate in the neighborhood − 1.1315** 
    
− 1.3643***  
[− 2.16] 
    
[− 2.73] 
Square of vacancy rate in the neighborhood 3.6450** 




    
[2.65] 
AA ∗ Vacancy rate in the neighborhood 0.8717 
    
0.8206  
[1.18] 
    
[1.18] 
AA ∗ Square of vacancy rate in the neighborhood − 1.4698 
    
− 1.3510  
[− 0.67] 
    
[− 0.63] 
Bedrooms − 0.0133 − 0.0117 − 0.0109 − 0.0133 − 0.0119 − 0.0138  
[− 1.42] [− 1.25] [− 1.17] [− 1.43] [− 1.27] [− 1.48] 
Bathrooms − 0.0022 − 0.0025 − 0.0013 − 0.0029 − 0.0013 − 0.0034  
[− 0.22] [− 0.25] [− 0.13] [− 0.29] [− 0.13] [− 0.34] 
Single family 0.0301 0.0421* 0.0424* 0.0286 0.0423* 0.0357  
[1.28] [1.83] [1.84] [1.22] [1.83] [1.54] 
Apartment − 0.0605*** − 0.0647*** − 0.0625*** − 0.0624*** − 0.0635*** − 0.0663***  
[− 3.29] [− 3.53] [− 3.42] [− 3.40] [− 3.47] [− 3.62] 
Percentage college educated in neighborhood − 0.0651 − 0.0223 − 0.1088* 0.0085 − 0.0125 − 0.0343  
[− 1.01] [− 0.43] [− 1.85] [0.16] [− 0.22] [− 0.65] 
Constant 0.4039*** 0.6375*** 0.4465*** 0.6124*** 0.5644*** 0.6927***  
[4.94] [22.81] [7.93] [19.02] [10.66] [19.99] 
Observations 4042 4060 4058 4050 4060 4052 
R-squared 0.021 0.009 0.015 0.012 0.011 0.012 
F Statistic 3.955 6.160 6.258 4.769 4.709 4.864 
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary response, where unity implies an email response received. Neighborhood is defined as a census tract. Distance 
is the straight line distance in number of miles to the tallest building in the city. Median rent is at the city level by number of bedrooms; percentage of 
median rent is the simple ratio of reported rent to the median rent. P-values reported in brackets. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level respectively. 
 
The parametric results show strong support for the local polynomial smoothing estimation strategy. The 
direction and magnitude of the results buttress the non-parametric figures. For example, the percentage of 
white residents in the neighborhood has a positive and strongly significant impact on the probability of a 
response controlling for race and the interaction of race and white residence percentage. This shows the 
discrimination rate against African Americans is much higher as the percentage of white residents in the 
neighborhood increases (from zero to one). The square of the percent of white residents shows the effect of 
additional white residents falls for neighborhoods that are more than 50% white. This result mirrors the finding 
in Fig. 1, while controlling for other covariates that may affect landlord response. 
The remaining parametric results also follow the nonparametric findings; however, some are not quite as 
statistically precise (although most remain statistically meaningful at the ten percent level). Higher rents lead to 
higher rates of discrimination against African Americans but at a decreasing rate around the critical value of 1.5 
times the median rent. Likewise, very low or high vacancy rates lead to increases in the discrimination rate 
against African Americans around the critical value of 15%. These patterns are similar to the nonparametric 
figures. The distance measure does not show statistical significance in any specification but the sign and 
magnitude are congruent with the nonparametric results. 
6. Conclusion 
We use a non-parametric estimation strategy to examine racial discrimination across neighborhood and housing 
unit characteristics. We examine how discrimination rates fluctuate within the distribution of racial composition, 
distance to city center, affordability, and vacancy rates. African American home-seekers are discriminated 
against at a higher rate than whites in neighborhoods that are racially mixed. They also face larger 
discrimination rates in areas with rents near or above the median rent for the city, as well as in areas with low or 
very high vacancy rates. Higher discrimination rates against African Americans are also observed in 
neighborhoods that are located very close to the center of the city or in the first ring of suburbs. 
While it is extremely difficult to determine the exact cause of discrimination, the results do suggest that landlord 
taste is not the central cause of discrimination rates against home-seekers. In general, the perceived preference 
or current/future customer prejudice cause is much more plausible. Both of these hypotheses of discrimination 
are in line with statistical discrimination. While still illegal, the results suggest it is the landlords' intent to 
maximize profits by treating the marginal home-seeker like a perceived typical group member. 
This study provides potential hot-spots for discrimination such as neighborhoods in the ‘tipping’ range, with low 
or very high vacancy rates, and with rents that are near or above the median rent for the city. This knowledge of 
where discrimination occurs is helpful for targeting future enforcement activities or for informing the choice of 
locations for public sessions on how to spot and report discriminatory behavior. We should note, however, that 
it is possible that a different sample of cities would produce different results, even if those cities have similar 
demographic and economic characteristics as our sample. It is possible that other factors about metropolitan 
areas such as segregation, commuting patterns, immigration, or local public services would play an important 
role that we do not capture in our data. 
Our work does suggest that studies of discrimination should consider taking into account the types of 
neighborhoods in the sample selection process, as oversampling from certain neighborhoods may be consistent 
with finding above or below average discrimination rates. The literature and enforcement of Fair Housing Laws 
should also consider how access to specific types of neighborhoods may have a differential impact on housing 
outcomes than a general level of discrimination. 
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Appendix A. Robustness of estimates to bandwidth choice 
The choice of bandwidth may be the most commonly criticized parameter selection for local smoothing 
techniques. We test how sensitive our primary results are to changing the rule of thumb bandwidth in the local 
polynomial regression. We examine how choosing a smaller (one-half the size) and larger (twice the size) 
bandwidth changes our results. 
Fig. A1 shows the discrimination rate across the percent of white residents' distribution using half and double 
the rule-of-thumb bandwidth, respectively. As Fig. A1 shows, the results are quite similar to the results for the 
standard rule of thumb bandwidth. Mixed neighborhoods still retain the higher discrimination rate differences 
with lower discrimination rates against African Americans in the largely majority neighborhood and the largely 
minority neighborhoods. Similarly, Fig. A2 illustrates the discrimination rates with half and double the rule-of-
thumb bandwidth, against African American and white home-seekers along the distance to the city center 
distribution. Again the choice of bandwidth does not seem to affect the pattern that we observe. 
 
 
Fig. A1. Local linear smoothing by percentage of white residents robustness checks. 
 
Fig. A2. Local linear smoothing by distance from city center robustness checks. 
 
Fig. A3, Fig. A4 show the bandwidth robustness checks across the rent ratio and vacancy rate distribution. We 
find that the bandwidth choice does not change the distribution of discrimination substantially across any of 
these attributes. We also check the robustness of the results with the degree of polynomial and the kernel 
function choice for the local smoothing estimation. The choice of these parameters does not significantly alter 
the main conclusions described above. 
 
Fig. A3. Local linear smoothing by rent ratio robustness checks. 
 
Fig. A4. Local linear smoothing by vacancy rates robustness checks. 
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1Tel.: + 1 414 288 5822. 
2State-level Fair Housing Assistance Programs (FHAP) also handle discrimination complaints. These programs 
receive an additional 3000–4000 complaints annually. More of these complaints (7–8%) end up in a 
charge of discrimination, but fewer are referred to the Department of Justice for enforcement. 
3The DOJ recently settled with Bank of America for $335 million in response to allegations that it's Countrywide 
Financial subsidiary practiced discrimination against African American and Hispanic borrowers by 
charging them higher fees and steering them into subprime mortgages (New York Times, “Country Wide 
Will Settle Bias Lawsuit”, December 21, 2011). 
4Three decades of academic work confirms that racial discrimination exists in housing markets. See Yinger 
(1986) for a classic example, and Hanson and Hawley (2011) for a recent example with citations to other 
newer studies. 
5Experimental studies of racial discrimination have become the standard in separately identifying racial 
discrimination from other confounding factors. Other studies that use observational data on home 
prices (sales, self-reported, or assessed) suffer from bias caused by correlation between unobserved 
factors at the unit, person, and neighborhood level with outcomes of interest and race. While we see 
value in these studies for their ability to examine important outcomes, we question the magnitudes 
associated with the level of discrimination they find. 
6Yinger puts these in the context of discrimination by real estate agents, but the concepts apply equally well to 
landlords of rental properties, which we examine here. 
7For details of the original experiment see Hanson and Hawley (2011). 
8The sample size is also limited by ArcGIS software not recognizing some addresses information, and by some 
landlords offering incomplete address information. 
9The median rent data come from HUD. The ACS provides a self-reported gross rent available at the county level 
for 2010. Using either data produces the same result. 
10The vacancy data come from Census. The ACS provides the number of for rent properties and the number of 
vacant for rent properties. The vacancy rate is a simple ratio of these two measures. 
11An urbanized area is defined by the Census Bureau as an area with 50,000 or more people and a densely 
settled core of census tracts or blocks along with adjacent territory with lower population density. 
12The lpoly statistical package in STATA 12 provides a “rule of thumb” method for bandwidth choice. We follow 
this choice as a starting point and provide robustness checks for this choice. 
13We use the Epanechnikov kernel which is standard and applies increased weights to the observations as the 
distance from the point of interest falls to zero. 
14We picked examples that were representative. The Atlanta sub-case is similar to Dallas and Houston. The 
Boston sub-case resembles Seattle and New York. The Chicago sub-case is comparable to San Francisco 
and Los Angeles. 
15Even though the confidence intervals begin to expand at around 20% white residents, the predicted values are 
still relatively flat. This is due to the relatively small sample size in those neighborhood types for Boston. 
16 
These locations are representative of different patterns for the cities in our data. Atlanta is similar to Chicago, 
Seattle, and San Francisco, where Boston is aligned with District of Columbia, Los Angeles, New York, 
Dallas and Houston. 
17In Atlanta, distance interacts with racial composition of neighborhoods. A basic description of the city is that 
there is an inner ring of African American majority neighborhoods surrounded by the heavily mixed 
urban area. Further out is a ring of more heavily African American populated suburbs encompassed by a 
ring of white populated neighborhoods. 
 
